Kazakhstan's Constitutional Referendum

12 Apr 2026

By: Mariya Kurmangaliyeva

Editor/Editor-in-Chief: Grace Samuel

The views expressed are the author's own and do not reflect the views of the International Relations Society.

"IMG_9329 Astana, Kazakhstan" by Ninara is licensed under CC BY 2.0.

A major transformation swept through Kazakhstan, and the constitutional referendum held on 15 March 2026 led to an increased concentration of presidential power under the guise of

democratic reform.

Kazakhstan is a landlocked country between Russia to the north and China to the east, and as the region’s largest economy, it has surpassed China in GDP per capita growth in 2025, making it a bellwether for political trends across the former Soviet republics. Originally, the emergence of Kazakhstan's independent constitution was formalised in 1995, four years after the country declared independence following the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The only other major constitutional changes undertaken in the year of 2022, a year marked by violent unrest that left 238 dead.

The reform was led by Tokayev, a president who was initially seen as a democratic contrast to

Nazarbayev, but who has instead overseen one of the most extensive constitutional changes

that the country has seen in history.

Spanning across 77 articles and amending over 80% of the constitution, the referendum has

established a key change from a bicameral to a unicameral parliament. An increasingly popular change is gaining traction across the Central Asian region.

The January 2022 protests – Qandy Qantar, or Bloody January- have left a haunting mark,

pushing Tokayev to centralise the executive power. The 2026 referendum is a direct extension of that logic, by abolishing the Senate entirely and replacing the bicameral parliament with a unicameral parliament, one with a single chamber named Kurltai; it was justified under the assumption that it would result in more efficient decision-making. Further consolidating executive authority, Tokayev will have the power, as president, to directly appoint the head of the Supreme Court, the Central Electoral Commission, the Supreme Audit Chamber, the State Security Service, and the Human Rights Commissioner.

Completely reversing the post-2022 changes that the West saw as an opportunity for a New

Kazakhstan. It aims to fully transition into a proportional representation system for parliamentary elections.

But besides direct executive changes to the way that the political system functions, the

referendum also suppresses LGBTQ rights, a change that is consequential to the suppression

of the propaganda enacted in December of 2025, as of the date, its established marriage will be defined as a union only between a man and a woman. Moreover, there are finer details like increasing centralisation because of Tokayev’s growing fear of elite defection and civil society influence. As NGOs are now obligated to make their foreign funding sources completely transparent and publicly accessible, a feature designed to expose independent civil society.

The constitutional reform is Tokayev’s attempt to stay one step ahead: to signal to the elite that the situation remains fully under control, the system is manageable, continuity is assured, and there is no need to panic. A decision that has directly affected power, regime durability, and values: The ability for it to empower presidential power undermines the role of international human‑rights law. Amnesty International's Director for Eastern Europe and Central Asia has even contended that Kazakhstan's political changes are creating a rollback of international law by increasing concentrations of power in one hand, deterring the progress the country has strived to make since its independence after 1991. By reducing LGBTQ rights and those of other minorities, the state restricts the freedom that individuals possess.

Moreover, a consideration is that the draft was "prepared without inclusive public consultations or meaningful input from independent civil society," prompting questions on the legitimacy of the state.

The referendum posed only one question — "Do you accept the new Constitution?" —

conveying that citizens could not vote on any individual amendments, only accept or reject the entire package.

But this pattern also carries regional significance, as it has persisted throughout Central Asia.

Once having all been led by the USSR, their systems are still building institutions under the

weight of corruption. It may signal to Russia and China, with the area overflowing with

autocracies, brutal leaders, and corruption. As one of the region's leading economies, with the

largest landmass, it may prompt swift change among other leaders. May lead to the continuation of Tokaev's power after his term is completed in 2029.

It was approved by nearly 90% of voters with 73% turnout, a percentage that exhibits “no real

opposition,” but what will it really mean for the country?

The nearly 90% voter approval and the 73% turnout will be cited as a democratic mandate in

history. But in a state where opposition has no institutional foothold, with citizens having only the choice between yes or no on 77 articles simultaneously, it reveals the architecture of consent rather than the will of the people. As the new constitution takes effect on 1 July 2026, the question is not whether Kazakhstan has changed — it has. The question is whether anyone outside its borders is watching closely enough to notice.